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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________
 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
In this suit under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), a plan participant 
claims that an insurance-company fiduciary wrongfully 
terminated his benefits.  The participant enrolled in his former 
employer’s welfare benefit plan, which provided long-term 
disability and life insurance benefits through group insurance 
policies.  When his health deteriorated to the point that he could 
no longer do his job, the participant claimed benefits under 




The insurance company, which funded and administered 
those policies, initially determined that the participant was 
totally disabled and authorized benefits under both policies.  Its 
in-house medical professionals reaffirmed that conclusion for 
about two years.  But then, with no recent change to the 
participant’s medical condition, the insurance company used a 
third-party vendor to select and retain an outside physician to 
evaluate the participant.  After an in-person examination, that 
physician concluded that the participant was not totally 
disabled, and on that basis, the insurance company terminated 
benefits under both policies.   
 
The participant administratively appealed, and the cycle 
repeated.  The insurance company’s in-house medical 
professionals once again found the participant to be totally 
disabled, and the insurance company reinstated benefits.  But 
it then used the same third-party vendor to arrange for a 
reevaluation of that assessment.  This time, two outside 
medical professionals performed paper reviews of the file.  
Both made findings against total disability.  Citing those 
reports along with the prior report from the other outside 
physician retained by the third-party vendor, the insurance 
company terminated the participant’s benefits – again.  
 
Those multiple requests for additional outside medical 
reviews were irregular in their timing and prompting.  To 
explain the requests made on administrative appeal – which 
were also irregular in their scope – the insurance company 
submitted an affidavit from one of its analysts.  But in 
evaluating the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the District Court did not consider that affidavit.  Instead, it 
analyzed the participant’s claim based on the administrative 
record, which the insurance company had filed.  On that record, 
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the District Court concluded that the termination of benefits 
was arbitrary and capricious, and it ordered their retroactive 
reinstatement.   
 
In reviewing that order de novo, see Viera v. Life Ins. Co. 
of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011), we will affirm.  A 
combination of structural and procedural factors compels that 
conclusion.  The insurance company performed two functions 
that are in financial tension with each other: it determined 
eligibility for benefits, and it funded benefits.  That creates a 
structural conflict of interest, which, by itself, is not a breach 
of fiduciary duty.  But here, based on only the administrative 
record – not the proffered supplemental affidavit, which was 
properly excluded – the insurance company also deviated 
significantly from its normal eligibility-review processes, 
primarily through its anomalous requests for outside 
reevaluation of the participant.  Those procedural irregularities 
aligned closely with the insurance company’s structural 
conflict of interest, so much so that the financial incentives at 
the core of the insurance company’s structural conflict 
influenced its fiduciary decision-making.  For these reasons, as 
elaborated below, the insurance company abused its discretion 
in terminating the participant’s benefits, and the District Court 




A. Leo Noga and the Insurance Policies 
Administered and Funded by Reliance 
Standard. 
Leo Noga began working as a financial advisor for Fulton 
Financial Corporation in 2009.  As an employee, he elected to 
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participate in the long-term disability and life insurance 
benefits that Fulton Financial offered through group insurance 
policies with Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company.  See 
generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (defining “participant” to 
include employees or former employees who are eligible to 
receive a benefit of any type from the employer’s employee 
benefit plan).  Those policies qualify as benefit plans subject 
to ERISA.  See generally id. §§ 1002(1) (defining “employee 
welfare benefit plan”), 1003(a) (subjecting employee benefit 
plans to ERISA).   
 
Both policies grant discretionary authority to Reliance 
Standard to determine eligibility for benefits.  See Reliance 
Standard Long Term Disability Policy at 6.0 (App. 92) 
(“Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company . . . has the 
discretionary authority to interpret the Plan and the insurance 
policy and to determine eligibility for benefits.”); Reliance 
Standard Life Insurance Policy at 11.0 (App. 1756) (same); see 
also Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Tr. Funds, 
944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Whether a plan 
administrator’s exercise of power is mandatory or 
discretionary depends upon the terms of the plan.”).  Due to 
that discretionary authority, Reliance Standard is a fiduciary 
with respect to those plans.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 
554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (explaining that a benefit 
determination is a fiduciary act); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) 
(identifying persons who qualify as ERISA fiduciaries).  But 
Reliance Standard also funded the long-term disability and life 




B. Noga’s Benefit Claims and Reliance 
Standard’s Initial Approval of Those Claims.  
In 2014, after working over five years for Fulton Financial, 
Noga began experiencing pain and numbness in his feet and 
legs.  His symptoms progressed over the next several months, 
and he started having difficulty standing, walking, and driving.  
By early 2015, he could no longer work as a financial advisor 
for Fulton Financial.  After appointments with various 
specialists, Noga was eventually diagnosed with neurogenic 
muscular atrophy and diabetic polyneuropathy.   
 
At that point, Noga applied for benefits under the long-term 
disability insurance policy with Reliance Standard.  That 
policy provides benefits for employees who are “Totally 
Disabled,” defined as those who “cannot perform the material 
duties of his/her Regular Occupation.”  Reliance Standard 
Long Term Disability Policy at 2.1, 9.0 (App. 88, 96).  In 
support of his claim, Noga submitted records from numerous 
treating physicians, including his primary care physician, a 
physiatrist, two neurologists, a neurosurgeon, a 
rheumatologist, and an orthopedic surgeon.   
 
Reliance Standard assigned an in-house registered nurse to 
review Noga’s medical records.  That nurse certified that Noga 
was “precluded from stand[ing] and walk[ing] on greater than 
an occasional basis” and that he “lack[ed] consistent work 
function.”  Reliance Standard Claim Notes (July 23, 2015) 
(App. 201).  And, in August 2015, Reliance Standard approved 
Noga’s claim for long-term disability benefits, finding that he 
was totally disabled under the policy. 
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With that favorable disability-benefits determination, Noga 
then sought an extension of his life insurance and a waiver of 
his premiums through a complementary provision in Fulton 
Financial’s group life insurance policy with Reliance Standard.  
That provision required Reliance Standard to extend an 
employee’s life insurance and waive any premiums owed 
“during a period of Total Disability.”  Reliance Standard Life 
Insurance Policy at 9.0 (App. 1754).   
 
Following a separate review process, Reliance Standard 
approved Noga’s life insurance claim in January 2016.   
 
C. Reliance Standard’s Periodic Reevaluation 
of Noga’s Disability Between October 2015 
and September 2017. 
Over the next two years, Reliance Standard periodically 
reviewed Noga’s updated medical records to assess his 
ongoing eligibility for long-term disability and life insurance 
benefits.  Noga’s physicians continually reaffirmed his 
diagnoses of neurogenic muscular atrophy and diabetic 
polyneuropathy – conditions that his endocrinologist described 
as “permanent” and “irreversible.”  Letter from 
Endocrinologist to Primary Care Physician (Aug. 11, 2016) 
(App. 903).  But beginning in mid-2016 and continuing into 
2017, Noga indicated during appointments with his primary 
care physician and his physiatrist that his legs were improving 
and feeling stronger, that he could walk up to one mile in the 
pool each day, and that he no longer needed leg braces while 
walking, though he still sometimes used a cane.  During that 
same period, however, Noga also reported that he continued to 
feel pain and numbness in his feet and legs, struggled to walk 




As it received updated medical records, Reliance Standard 
assigned its own registered nurses to review them.  Four 
different nurses – on six separate occasions between October 
2015 and September 2017 – recertified Noga’s eligibility for 
benefits.  
 
D. Reliance Standard’s October 2017 Decision 
to Conduct an Independent Medical 
Examination and Its Later Termination of 
Noga’s Benefits. 
In October 2017 – despite having recertified Noga’s 
benefits less than a month prior – Reliance Standard requested 
that Noga undergo an independent medical examination, which 
is commonly referred to as an ‘IME.’  Reliance Standard used 
a third-party vendor to select a doctor who was not Noga’s 
treating physician or one of its in-house medical professionals.  
The chosen doctor, a physiatrist, examined Noga in November, 
and determined that the numbness and pain that Noga 
experienced were consistent with a diagnosis of diabetic 
polyneuropathy and that the impairment was “permanent in 
nature.”  Physiatrist IME Report at 8 (Nov. 28, 2017) (App. 
1268).  Still, the physiatrist found that Noga “demonstrated a 
high degree of symptom exaggeration or inappropriate pain 
behavior” and that he “was able to move about the room freely 
without any significant difficulty.”  Id. at 5, 7 (App. 1265, 
1267).  The physiatrist’s conclusion was that Noga was 
“capable of gainful employment.”  Id. at 8 (App. 1268). 
 
Reliance Standard adopted that conclusion.  After 
reviewing the IME report, it determined that Noga was no 
longer totally disabled from performing his regular occupation.  
 
9 
Reliance Standard then terminated Noga’s benefits under both 
the long-term disability and the life insurance policies in 
December 2017.   
 
E. Noga’s Administrative Appeal and the 
Reinstatement of Benefits. 
 
Noga administratively appealed that decision to Reliance 
Standard’s Quality Review Unit.  As part of his appeal, he 
submitted updated medical records from his primary care 
physician and his physiatrist.  His treating physicians noted 
that Noga continued to struggle with walking and balancing – 
often tripping or falling – and that he suffered from fatigue as 
well as decreased feeling in his feet.   
 
Reliance Standard then tasked another registered nurse with 
reviewing Noga’s appeal.  In March 2018, that nurse 
determined that Noga’s medical records supported an ongoing 
“lack of consistent work function at any level.”  Reliance 
Standard Claim Notes (Mar. 19, 2018) (App. 208).  Based on 
the nurse’s opinion, the senior benefits analyst assigned to the 
administrative appeal overturned the decision to terminate 
Noga’s benefits on March 22, 2018.   
 
F. Reliance Standard’s Self-Initiated 
Reevaluation and Eventual Termination of 
Benefits. 
The next day, that same analyst changed course.  Despite 
the decision to reinstate Noga’s benefits – which was 
apparently made with awareness of both the nurse’s opinion 
and the report of the outside physiatrist – the analyst requested 
two more peer reviews from outside medical professionals.  
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The same third-party vendor that secured the IME also selected 
an endocrinologist and an occupational medicine specialist to 
perform those peer reviews.   
 
The endocrinologist did not examine Noga but performed a 
paper review of his records.  Based only on that review of 
Noga’s file, the endocrinologist concluded that Noga’s 
diabetes was well controlled and that – solely from an 
endocrinology perspective – he could work on a full-time 
basis.   
 
The occupational medicine specialist conducted the second 
peer review, again without examining Noga personally but 
reviewing only his medical records.  Based solely on that paper 
review, the occupational medicine specialist concluded that 
Noga was capable of full-time work but noted that Noga’s 
neurogenic muscular atrophy and diabetic polyneuropathy 
were “disease processes which [would] wax and wane over 
time.”  Occupational Medicine Specialist Peer Review at 11 
(Apr. 6, 2018) (App. 1415).  
  
In May 2018, relying on the prior physiatrist’s IME report 
and the two new peer paper reviews, Reliance Standard 
reversed its reinstatement of Noga’s benefits and upheld its 
initial termination decision.  With that determination, Noga 
had no further recourse under the plan, and because the 
administrative remedies were exhausted, Reliance Standard 
notified Noga that he had a right to bring a civil action under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  See Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 
800 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Except in limited circumstances . . . a 
federal court will not entertain an ERISA claim unless the 
plaintiff has exhausted the remedies available under the 
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plan.”); see also Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
279 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Consistent with the termination notice from Reliance 
Standard, Noga filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.  He asserted that the 
termination of his benefits was arbitrary and capricious, and he 
brought a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) to reinstate 
his long-term disability and life insurance benefits.  Noga sued 
two defendants in their official capacities: Reliance Standard 
as a fiduciary and Fulton Financial Corporation Employee 
Benefit Plan as the employee welfare benefit plan.  See Larson 
v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 
2013) (allowing a suit against an insurance company under 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) when the insurance company “decides 
contractual eligibility and benefits questions and pays the 
claims”); Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same); Graden v. 
Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 301 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(recognizing that a plan and a plan administrator may be sued 
under § 1132(a)(1)(B)).1 
 
 
1 In creating a federal cause of action, § 1132(a)(1)(B) contains 
no textual limitation as to who may be sued.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B); Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205 (“There are no limits 
stated anywhere in § 1132(a) about who can be sued . . . .”).  
This Circuit has interpreted § 1132(a)(1)(B) as authorizing 
official-capacity claims but not individual-capacity claims.  
See Graden, 496 F.3d at 301. 
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Reliance Standard then filed a notice to remove the case to 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  ERISA grants 
concurrent original jurisdiction over § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims to 
state and federal courts.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).  Thus, by 
bringing claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B), Noga’s suit was within 
the original jurisdiction of the District Court, and it could be 
removed on that basis – if the other defendant, the Plan, joined 
in or consented to the notice of removal.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1441(a), 1446(b)(2)(A).  The Plan consented, and the case 
was removed to the District Court.  
 
Once in federal court, Noga sought to proceed against only 
Reliance Standard.  He twice invoked Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(a) to voluntarily dismiss the Plan.  Dismissals 
under Rule 41(a) may be effectuated by stipulation or by 
notice, and a proper dismissal using either method is self-
executing.2  Noga first filed a stipulated dismissal before the 
Plan had entered an appearance in the case.  The only other 
party that had entered an appearance, Reliance Standard, 
joined the stipulation, which did not state whether it was with 
 
2 See State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cnty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 
406–07 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Every court to have considered the 
nature of a voluntary stipulation of dismissal under 
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) has come to the conclusion that it is 
immediately self-executing.  No separate entry or order is 
required to effectuate the dismissal.” (citations and footnote 
omitted)); In re Bath & Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 
535 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] filing under 
[Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)] is a notice, not a motion.  Its effect is 
automatic: the defendant does not file a response, and no order 
of the district court is needed to end the action.”).   
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or without prejudice.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).  
Because that first voluntary dismissal lacked an indication 
either way, it functioned as a dismissal without prejudice.  See 
id. R. 41(a)(1)(B).   
 
About four months later, without the Plan filing an answer 
or moving for summary judgment in the interim, Noga filed a 
notice of dismissal, again to dismiss the Plan voluntarily.  See 
id. R. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).  Like its predecessor, that voluntary 
dismissal did not state whether it was with or without 
prejudice.  But under Rule 41, a second voluntary dismissal 
“operates as an adjudication on the merits,” and thus that notice 
dismissed the Plan with prejudice.  Id. R. 41(a)(1)(B).   
 
The two remaining parties, Noga and Reliance Standard, 
then moved for summary judgment.  In connection with its 
motion, Reliance Standard submitted the administrative 
record.  Considering only that record – and not a later-filed 
affidavit from the senior benefits analyst who oversaw Noga’s 
administrative appeal – the District Court determined that the 
termination of Noga’s benefits was arbitrary and capricious.  
That conclusion resulted from the combined effect of two 
factors: Reliance Standard’s structural conflict of interest (that 
it both determined eligibility for benefits and paid for benefits) 
and the procedural irregularities in Reliance Standard’s 
termination of benefits.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in Noga’s favor and ordered the retroactive 
reinstatement of his benefits.  After an unsuccessful motion for 
reconsideration, Reliance Standard timely appealed.   
 
The District Court’s summary-judgment order is a final, 
appealable decision.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Through Noga’s 
Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissals, all claims against the Plan 
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were dismissed with prejudice.3  Therefore, the District Court’s 
summary-judgment order against the only other defendant, 
Reliance Standard, “ends the litigation on the merits,” and 
constitutes a final decision sufficient for this Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); 
see Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 244 
(3d Cir. 2013) (“Generally, a dismissal with prejudice 
constitutes an appealable final order under § 1291.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
On appeal, Reliance Standard argues that the District Court 
erred in two respects.  First, it contends that the District Court 
should have considered the analyst’s affidavit.  Second, it 
submits that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
termination of Noga’s benefits was arbitrary and capricious.  
 
 
3 Rule 41(a) provides a mechanism for a plaintiff to voluntarily 
dismiss an entire lawsuit, and this Circuit also recognizes that 
the rule allows a party to voluntarily dismiss all of its claims 
against a particular party.  See Young v. Wilky Carrier Corp., 
150 F.2d 764, 764 (3d Cir. 1945); see also 9 Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2362 (4th ed. 2020) (explaining that “the sounder view and 
the weight of judicial authority” are that Rule 41(a) permits 
dismissal of all claims against one party and does not require 




A. The District Court Did Not Err by Excluding 
Reliance Standard’s Proffered Affidavit. 
1. The ERISA Record Rule and the 
Structural-Conflict Exception.  
Under the ERISA record rule, judicial review of an ERISA 
fiduciary’s discretionary adverse benefit decision is confined 
to the information contained in the administrative record.  See 
Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that, “under most circumstances,” the 
administrative record “cannot be supplemented during 
litigation” (quoting Kosiba v. Merck & Co., 384 F.3d 58, 67 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2004))); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 
433, 440 (3d Cir. 1997) (evaluating a claim for long-term 
disability benefits based on the “whole record” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by 
Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 847 (3d Cir. 2011).  
The administrative record consists of the materials before the 
fiduciary who makes the benefit decisions on internal review, 
and it typically contains relevant plan documents (such as an 
insurance policy), the claim file (the claim, supporting 
information supplied by the claimant, as well as information 
related to the claim that was considered, collected, or generated 
by the fiduciary), and the fiduciary’s final determination with 
respect to the claim.  See Howley, 625 F.3d at 793 (“[C]ourts 
generally must base their review of an administrator’s decision 
on the materials that were before the administrator when it 
made the challenged decision.”); Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 440 
(explaining that for an adverse benefit determination, the 
“‘whole’ record consists of that evidence that was before the 
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administrator when he made the decision being reviewed” 
(citations omitted)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(m)(8) 
(identifying categories of information relevant to a benefit 
determination). 
   
Despite the clarity of the ERISA record rule, its origin is 
somewhat convoluted.  Statutory text does not conflict with the 
rule, but it does not compel a court to evaluate adverse benefit 
determinations based solely on the administrative record.  
ERISA requires adequate written notice of an adverse benefit 
determination that “set[s] forth the specific reasons for such 
denial.”  29 U.S.C. § 1133(1).  It also demands that any 
participant who receives an adverse benefit determination be 
afforded “a reasonable opportunity . . . for a full and fair review 
by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the 
claim.”  Id. § 1133(2).  But nowhere does ERISA state that 
review of an adverse benefit determination is limited to the 
‘whole record’ before the benefits decision-maker.  Cf. 
5 U.S.C. § 706 (requiring judicial review of agency action 
based on the “whole record”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring 
judicial review of Social Security benefit determinations based 
on a “transcript of the record including the evidence upon 
which the findings and decision complained of are based”).   
 
That is not the only instance of statutory silence in ERISA.  
It also omits the standard of judicial review for adverse benefit 
determinations.  The Supreme Court resolved that statutorily 
open question by holding that the standard depends on whether 
a plan grants discretion to the fiduciary who makes benefits 
decisions.  See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 115 (1989).  If a plan does not do so, then a court reviews 
an adverse benefit determination de novo.  See id.  But if a plan 
does confer discretionary authority on a fiduciary decision-
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maker, then a court reviews an adverse benefit determination 
for an abuse of discretion under the arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard.  See id.; McCann v. Unum Provident, 907 F.3d 130, 
147 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 
That standard bears heavily on the ERISA record rule.  That 
is so because, pursuant to their ability to develop federal 
common law for ERISA regulated plans, see Firestone, 
489 U.S. at 110, federal courts have imported several 
administrative-law principles into ERISA litigation.4  And 
administrative law associates the arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard with a record-review requirement.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 
 
4 See, e.g., Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117 (referencing administrative 
law for the proposition that courts may conduct a combination-
of-factors analysis while reviewing ERISA adverse benefits 
determinations under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard); 
Wolf v. Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 185–86 
(3d Cir. 1984) (incorporating the administrative exhaustion 
requirement into ERISA civil enforcement actions); Amato v. 
Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566–67 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing 
that “the text of ERISA nowhere mentions the exhaustion 
doctrine,” but that “sound policy requires the application of the 
exhaustion doctrine in suits under the Act”).  But see 
Borntrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 
425 F.3d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005) (eschewing the 
importation of administrative-law principles in assessing 
whether an order remanding to an ERISA plan administrator 
was a final, appealable decision); Mark D. DeBofsky, The 
Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit 
Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 730 (2004) (arguing that 
“federal courts have mistakenly incorporated administrative 
law principles into ERISA benefit decisions”).  
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(authorizing courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law” based on a review of the “whole record 
or those parts of it cited by a party”).   
 
Drawing on administrative-law principles to fashion the 
common law for ERISA, this Circuit has linked the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard to record review.  See Mitchell, 
113 F.3d at 440 (applying the whole-record requirement from 
the Social Security Act to arbitrary-and-capricious review 
under ERISA).  Specifically, because discretionary adverse 
benefit determinations are reviewed under the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard, those decisions are bound by the ERISA 
record rule.  See id.; see also Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99, 111 (2013) (“The Courts of 
Appeals have generally limited the record for judicial review 
to the administrative record compiled during internal review.” 
(citing Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 121 (3d 
Cir. 2012)) (other citations omitted)).  Conversely, this Circuit 
has held that the ERISA record rule does not apply to adverse 
benefit determinations subject to de novo review.  See Luby, 
944 F.2d at 1185 (holding that “de novo review over an ERISA 
determination between beneficiary claimants is not limited to 
the evidence before the [plan administrator]”).  Thus, a plan 
that grants discretion to a fiduciary to make benefit 
determinations, by that same choice, elects to have those 
benefit decisions governed by the ERISA record rule.   
 
That rule is not absolute, however.  The administrative 
record focuses on a specific benefit claim, and for that reason, 
the record may lack information about a fiduciary’s “potential 
biases and conflicts of interest.”  Kosiba, 384 F.3d at 67 n.5; 
see also Howley, 625 F.3d at 794 (“[A] conflicted 
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administrator, especially one whose decision-making has been 
affected by that conflict, is not at all likely to volunteer that 
information.”).  But any such structural conflict may be 
relevant to an adverse benefit determination.  See Glenn, 
554 U.S. at 111 (recognizing that a factor in determining 
whether a plan administrator abused its discretion is whether 
the administrator acted under a conflict of interest); Firestone, 
489 U.S. at 115 (same).  Despite its potential relevance, 
information regarding a structural conflict may be omitted 
from the administrative record due to the combination of 
information asymmetry and financial incentives: the 
participant may not know of the conflict, and the fiduciary has 
no financial incentive to disclose it.  See Howley, 625 F.3d at 
794 (“To allow an administrator the benefit of a conflict merely 
because it managed to successfully keep that conflict hidden 
during the administrative process would be absurd.”).  To 
account for the potential omission of that evidence, as a limited 
exception to the ERISA record rule, the administrative record 
may be supplemented to prove or disprove a structural conflict 
of interest or its severity.  See id. (“[C]ourts plainly must be 
willing to consider evidence relating to ‘the nature, extent, and 
effect on the decision-making process of any conflict of 
interest’ revealed during the litigation process.” (quoting Burke 
v. Pitney Bowes Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 544 F.3d 
1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008))); Kosiba, 384 F.3d at 67 n.5, 68 
(allowing either party on remand to supplement the record with 
evidence of the plan’s “actual funding mechanism” to prove 
whether the administrator “acted under a financial conflict of 
interest”).  
 
The exception to the ERISA record rule for structural 
conflicts is narrow and does not allow supplementation of the 
record with information related to the claim or the review 
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process.  See, e.g., Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 
168–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a participant’s reliance on 
medical reports that were not submitted to the plan 
administrator or made part of the record), abrogated on other 
grounds by Miller, 632 F.3d at 847; Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to 
consider “three additional medical evaluations” submitted by a 
participant to “support her claim of continued total disability” 
after the plan administrator’s final decision), abrogated on 
other grounds by Miller, 632 F.3d at 847.  That is so because 
the justifications for the structural-conflict exception – 
information asymmetry and financial incentives – do not 
similarly apply to information about the claim or the review 
process.  Both the participant, who claims benefits, and the 
fiduciary, who evaluates the benefit claim, have incentives to 
develop the administrative record with respect to the benefit 
claim.  See Jebian v. Hewlett Packard Co. Emp. Benefits Org. 
Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“ERISA is designed to promote a good-faith bilateral 
exchange of information on the merits of claims . . . .”).  If the 
participant does not explain the claim or does not provide 
supporting information, then it is more likely that the fiduciary 
will deny the claim.  See Heimeshoff, 571 U.S. at 111 (“[T]o 
the extent participants fail to develop evidence during internal 
review, they risk forfeiting the use of that evidence in district 
court.”).  Similarly, the fiduciary may insulate an adverse 
benefit determination from reversal by including in the record 
supporting rationales and evidence for its decision.  As both 
parties have adequate incentives to develop the record about a 
claim and its processing, the ERISA record rule prohibits 
supplementation of the administrative record with post hoc 




2. Reliance Standard’s Proffered Affidavit 
Cannot Be Considered. 
 
Because the relevant insurance policies grant discretion 
over adverse benefit determinations to Reliance Standard, the 
ERISA record rule governs this controversy.  Nonetheless, 
Reliance Standard seeks to supplement the administrative 
record with an affidavit from the senior benefits analyst 
responsible for Noga’s administrative appeal.   
 
The affidavit contextualizes and augments information in 
the claim file.  In that sworn written testimony, the analyst 
explained that in reevaluating Noga’s claim on administrative 
appeal, he originally sent it to an in-house nurse who had not 
previously worked on the claim, and that based on that nurse’s 
review, he entered a claim note to reinstate benefits.5  The 
analyst further averred that he later sought two peer reviews of 
Noga’s medical records because “[w]hen an independent 
physician has performed a review, Reliance [Standard] does 
not rely on a nurse for a second opinion.”  Jackson Aff. ¶ 24 
(App. 1991).     
 
The proffered explanation for the two outside referrals 
could have been contemporaneously memorialized in the claim 
 
5 Perhaps suggestive of a desire to remove the initial claim note 
recommending reinstatement, the analyst also explained that 
the claims system did not permit him to delete that note.  See 
Jackson Aff. ¶ 25 (App. 1991) (“[T]he claim system we use did 
not allow me to remove my March 22, 2018 claim note.”); see 
also id. ¶ 22 (the March 22, 2018 claim note states, “Decision 




file.  But it was not.  And because it was not included in the 
administrative record, the ERISA record rule bars its 
consideration. 
 
Nor does that proffered explanation qualify for the 
structural-conflict exception to the ERISA record rule.  That 
exception permits supplementation of the administrative 
record only for information that tends to prove or disprove a 
structural conflict of interest or its severity.  See, e.g., Howley, 
625 F.3d at 793–94 (endorsing consideration of extrinsic 
evidence of a plan administrator’s conflict of interest).  And 
here, Reliance Standard does not offer the analyst’s affidavit to 
disprove or mitigate Reliance Standard’s structural conflict of 
interest, which arises from its dual roles of determining 
eligibility for benefits and funding them.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. 
at 112, 114; Miller, 632 F.3d at 847.  Instead, Reliance 
Standard seeks to use the affidavit to provide context for 
procedural anomalies in the handling of Noga’s claim.  But an 
ERISA administrative record may not be supplemented with 
post hoc explanations for procedural irregularities.  It makes 
no difference that Reliance Standard offers the affidavit in 
partial rebuttal to Noga’s procedural-irregularity argument.  
Because procedural anomalies impugn a fiduciary’s 
impartiality, a benefits decision-maker has an incentive to 
include in the administrative record information that explains 
procedural irregularities.  Reliance Standard did not do so, and 
it may not augment the administrative record with such 








B. Due to the Combined Effect of a Structural 
Conflict of Interest and Two Significant 
Procedural Irregularities, Reliance 
Standard’s Decision to Terminate Noga’s 
Benefits Was an Abuse of Discretion.  
As explained above, Reliance Standard has discretionary 
authority over the disputed benefits decisions, and therefore its 
adverse benefit determinations are reviewed under the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 111; 
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; McCann, 907 F.3d at 147.  This 
standard is nominally deferential: a fiduciary’s decision “will 
not be disturbed if reasonable.”  Conkright v. Frommert, 
559 U.S. 506, 521 (2010) (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111).   
 
Nonetheless, there are several ways in which a fiduciary 
who makes benefits decisions may fail the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard.  An adverse benefit determination made 
“without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or 
erroneous as a matter of law” qualifies as arbitrary and 
capricious.  Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 (quoting Adamo v. Anchor 
Hocking Corp., 720 F. Supp. 491, 500 (W.D. Pa. 1989)); see 
also Grossmuller v. Int’l Union, United Auto. Workers, Loc. 
813, 715 F.2d 853, 858 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983) (requiring a plan 
administrator to “consider the position of both sides before 
rendering a decision” (emphasis and citation omitted)).  In 
addition, a combination of case-specific structural and 
procedural factors may demonstrate that a fiduciary abused its 
discretion in making an adverse benefit determination, and 
such a decision would likewise fail arbitrary-and-capricious 
review.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 116–17; Est. of Schwing v. Lilly 
Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 526 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Miller, 
632 F.3d at 845 n.2 (“In the ERISA context, the arbitrary and 
 
24 
capricious and abuse of discretion standards of review are 
essentially identical.” (citation omitted)).  
 
The structural consideration under the combination-of-
factors analysis focuses on the role of financial incentives in 
the plan’s administration.  See Post, 501 F.3d at 162.  When 
the same entity administers a plan and pays the benefits due 
under the plan, it has a structural conflict of interest.  See 
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 112, 114; see also Miller, 632 F.3d at 847 
(“[A] conflict arises where an employer both funds and 
evaluates claims.” (citation omitted)).  But that conflict alone 
does not render a fiduciary’s adverse benefit determination an 
abuse of discretion.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117–18; Dowling 
v. Pension Plan for Salaried Emps. of Union Pac. Corp. & 
Affiliates, 871 F.3d 239, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2017); Fleisher, 
679 F.3d at 122 n.3 (stating that a conflict of interest “is not . . . 
inherently a determinative factor” (citation omitted)).  Rather, 
“that conflict must be weighed as [one] factor,” Firestone, 
489 U.S. at 115 (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted), along with “the process . . . used in denying benefits,” 
Miller, 632 F.3d at 845.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 111, 118–19. 
 
The procedural factor examines the presence or absence of 
irregularities in the handling of benefit claims.  Not every 
anomaly carries great weight; a fiduciary, even one with a 
structural conflict of interest, need not maintain a procedurally 
immaculate claim file to avoid an abuse-of-discretion finding.  
But critically, under the combination-of-factors analysis, 
procedural irregularities gain significance the more closely that 
they align with the financial incentives that create a structural 
conflict of interest.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117.  In that vein, 
caselaw has identified several procedural irregularities that 
bear directly on the financial incentives at the core of a 
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structural conflict.  See Miller, 632 F.3d at 848–55; Post, 
501 F.3d at 166–68; Kosiba, 384 F.3d at 67–68; Pinto v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393–94 (3d Cir. 
2000), abrogated on other grounds by Miller, 632 F.3d at 847; 
see also Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118.  As explained below, this case 
involves one such procedural irregularity: requests for outside 
examination or review that are unusual in their timing, impetus, 
or scope.     
 
1. Reliance Standard Has a Structural 
Conflict of Interest. 
 
No one disputes that Reliance Standard has a structural 
conflict of interest.  The group insurance policies, which were 
included in the administrative record, state that Reliance 
Standard both makes benefits eligibility decisions and funds 
those benefits.  For an ERISA fiduciary, such a dual role 
constitutes a conflict of interest.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 112, 
114; Miller, 632 F.3d at 847. 
 
Under the structural-conflict exception to the ERISA record 
rule, a court may consider extra-record evidence that would 
affect the weight afforded to a structural conflict of interest.  
Neither party offers such evidence.  Noga does not submit 
evidence, such as “a history of biased claims administration,” 
that would enhance the weight given to Reliance Standard’s 
structural conflict of interest.  Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117 (citation 
omitted).  Reliance Standard likewise offers no evidence to 
contextualize or mitigate its structural conflict of interest.  
Although evidence that a conflicted plan administrator “has 
taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote 
accuracy” may minimize the effect of a structural conflict of 
interest “perhaps to the vanishing point,” Reliance Standard 
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did not seek to demonstrate, for example, that it “wall[ed] off 
claims administrators from those interested in firm finances” 
or “impos[ed] management checks that penalize inaccurate 
decisionmaking irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits.”  
Id.  Instead, as explained above, the affidavit proffered by 
Reliance Standard attempted to explain only a procedural 
irregularity.  Thus, here, neither party provides a basis for 
affording the structural conflict-of-interest factor either 
enhanced or diminished weight.6   
 
6 Reliance Standard’s use of a third-party vendor to select and 
retain outside medical professionals to perform examinations 
and reviews may superficially appear to enhance the structural 
integrity of its claim-review process.  But Reliance Standard 
does not make that argument, and on closer inspection, such 
outsourcing may exacerbate the underlying structural conflict 
because it allows omission of several potentially relevant 
pieces of information from the administrative record.  For 
instance, the administrative record lacks information regarding 
important aspects of the third-party vendor’s decision-making, 
such as the criteria that the vendor used to select the examiners 
and reviewers; the universe of candidates it considered for 
those roles; the frequency with which the vendor selected these 
reviewers and examiners; and the compensation that each 
received.  Perhaps more significantly, the administrative record 
lacks information on Reliance Standard’s methodology for 
selecting the third-party vendor and the terms of its 
arrangement with that vendor.  Noga did not seek any of this 
extra-record information.  Yet due to the combined effect of 
his inability to access that information and the potential 
alignment of those unknown facts with Reliance Standard’s 




2. Two Procedural Irregularities Stand Out 
in Reliance Standard’s Handling of 
Noga’s Benefit Claims.  
 
Noga identifies two procedural irregularities related to the 
termination of his benefit claims: one in the initial benefit 
termination decision and the other on administrative appeal.   
 
The first procedural anomaly relates to the unusual timing 
of and impetus for the IME request.  According to Reliance 
Standard, that decision was prompted by indications from 
Noga’s treating physicians that his legs were improving, that 
he no longer needed leg braces, and that he could walk up to a 
mile in the pool.  But Reliance Standard had that information 
since August and September of 2016 – more than a year earlier.  
And during that intervening year, three different in-house 
nurses considered those facts, and each time they recertified 
that Noga remained totally disabled, with the latter two 
certifications occurring in August and September of 2017.  Yet 
less than a month after the latest nurse review – and “without 
receiving any new medical information,” Miller, 632 F.3d at 
848 – Reliance Standard referred Noga for an IME.  Although 
fiduciary decision-makers should not be “penalize[d] . . . for 
seeking independent medical examinations at appropriate 
stages of the claims determination process,” Kosiba, 384 F.3d 
at 68, the timing of and professed need for the IME were 
irregular.   
 
The second procedural anomaly concerns a request for 
outside examination that is unusual in its timing, impetus, and 
scope.  On administrative appeal, a Reliance Standard senior 
benefits analyst overturned his initial termination decision and 
reinstated Noga’s benefits based on the recommendation of an 
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in-house nurse who had not previously worked on Noga’s 
claim.  But the day after he reinstated Noga’s benefits, the same 
analyst reversed course: he put a hold on the reinstatement of 
Noga’s benefits and requested two peer reviews of Noga’s 
medical records.  That request for outside examination is 
unusual in its timing (a day after reinstating benefits), its 
impetus (the administrative record does not explain the reason 
for this change of course), and its scope (seeking paper reviews 
from two additional outside medical professionals).  See Post, 
501 F.3d at 166 (noting that “courts must . . . consider the 
circumstances that surround an administrator ordering a paper 
review”).   
 
3. In Combination, the Structural and 
Procedural Factors Demonstrate that 
Reliance Standard Abused Its Discretion 
in Terminating Noga’s Benefits.  
Both of those procedural irregularities have a significant 
connection to the financial incentives at the core of Reliance 
Standard’s structural conflict of interest.   
 
The first procedural irregularity – the unusual timing of and 
impetus for the IME – directly led to Reliance Standard’s 
initial termination of benefits.  Two months after that IME 
request, once the IME report was completed, and without any 
other updates to Noga’s medical files, Reliance Standard 
reversed its finding of total disability.  The request for the IME 
by itself suggests “procedural bias,” Kosiba, 384 F.3d at 67, 
because it constituted “[i]nconsistent treatment of the same 
facts” that Reliance Standard’s in-house nurse considered less 
than a month before the IME request, Pinto, 214 F.3d at 393.  
And because that unusual decision resulted in the termination 
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of benefits, it strongly suggests that Reliance Standard was 
acting not as a “disinterested fiduciary” but as a financially 
motivated actor seeking to pay less money out in benefit 
claims.  Kosiba, 384 F.3d at 67. 
   
The second procedural irregularity – the unusual timing of, 
impetus for, and scope of requests for outside review – is 
similarly tied to Reliance Standard’s financial interests.  In a 
near-immediate backtracking of his decision to reinstate 
Noga’s benefits on administrative appeal, a Reliance Standard 
analyst requested two paper reviews of Noga’s medical file 
from outside medical professionals.  Relying on those reviews 
and the IME report from the physiatrist retained by the third-
party vendor, the analyst reversed the reinstatement of benefits 
and denied Noga’s benefit claims.  The sudden request for 
those reviews directly changed the financial outcome – again 
in Reliance Standard’s favor.   
 
Taken together, the structural and procedural factors 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  Though its own nurses 
consistently recertified Noga’s eligibility for benefits, Reliance 
Standard disregarded those recommendations and sought an 
IME and two peer reviews – questionable choices that led 
directly to the termination of Noga’s benefits.  Those decisions 
look no better from a distance: in an eight-month period, 
Reliance Standard sustained benefits, terminated benefits, 
reversed the termination, and then reversed the reversal – with 
the end result that Reliance Standard no longer had to fund 
either Noga’s long-term disability or his life insurance.  See 
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118 (sustaining the conclusion that a 
conflicted plan administrator abused its discretion where the 
procedural irregularities were “financially advantageous” for 
the plan).   
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Nor is this an instance in which an abundance of evidence 
supporting the denial of the benefits claim overcomes the 
combination of a structural conflict of interest and procedural 
irregularities.  See Miller, 632 F.3d at 846 (recognizing that 
neither a structural conflict of interest nor procedural 
irregularities may “tip the scales in favor of finding that the 
administrator abused its discretion” if there is an abundance of 
evidence of a claimant’s misconduct (alterations omitted) 
(quoting Est. of Schwing, 562 F.3d at 526)).  Without the three 
procedurally irregular outside reports, the record evidence, 
which includes reports from Noga’s treating physicians as well 
as multiple assessments by Reliance Standard’s in-house 
nurses, favors the continued award of benefits to Noga.  
 
In sum, the close alignment of the procedural irregularities 
with the financial incentives creating the structural conflict 
demonstrates that Reliance Standard abused its discretion: its 
conflict “actually infected” its decision to terminate Noga’s 
benefits.  Dowling, 871 F.3d at 251.   
 
*  *  * 
  
For these reasons, the District Court properly ordered the 
retroactive reinstatement of Noga’s benefits.  See Miller, 
632 F.3d at 856–57.  We will affirm. 
